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Introduction:  It  is widely  acknowledged  that  breaches  and  misuses  of health-related  data  can  have  serious
implications  and  consequently  they often  carry  penalties.  However,  harm  due  to  the  omission  of health
data  usage,  or data  non-use,  is  a subject  that lacks  attention.  A better  understanding  of  this  ‘other  side  of
the coin’  is  required  before  it can  be addressed  effectively.
Approach:  This  article  uses  an  international  case  study  approach  to  explore  why  data  non-use  is difﬁcult
to  ascertain,  the  sources  and  types  of health-related  data  non-use,  its implications  for citizens  and  society
and some  of the  reasons  it occurs.  It does  this  by focussing  on  issues  with  clinical  care  records,  research
data  and governance  frameworks  and  associated  examples  of  non-use.
Results  and  discussion:  The  non-use  of  health-related  data  is a  complex  issue  with  multiple  explanations.
Individual  instances  of data  non-use  can  be  associated  with  harm,  but taken  together,  they  can  describe
a trail  of data  non-use  that  may  complicate  and compound  its  impacts.  There  is  ample  indirect  evidence
that  health  data  non-use  is  implicated  in the  deaths  of  many  thousands  of people  and  potentially  £billions
in  ﬁnancial  burdens  to societies.
Conclusions:  Harm  due  to the  non-use  of health  data  is difﬁcult  to  attribute  unequivocally  and  actual
proven  evidence  is  sparse.  Although  it can be  elusive,  it is  nevertheless  a real  problem  with  widespread
and  serious,  if largely  unquantiﬁable,  consequences.  The most  effective  initiatives  to  address  speciﬁc
contexts  of data  non-use  will  be those  that:  ﬁrstly,  understand  the  pertinent  sources,  types  and  reasons
for  data  non-use  in a given  domain  in  order  to meet  the  challenges  and  create  appropriate  incentives  and
repercussions;  and  secondly,  are  cognisant  of  the  multiple  aspects  to this  complex  issue  in  other  domains
to keep  beneﬁts  and  limitations  in perspective,  to move  steadily  towards  socially  responsible  reuse  of
data  becoming  the  norm  to save  lives  and  resources.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an open  access  article  under  the CC. Introduction
In 2014, the (UK) Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics Working Party
n Biological and Health Data and the Wellcome Trust’s Expert
dvisory Group on Data Access commissioned a review of evidence
elating to harm resulting from uses of health and biomedical data
1]. The main focus was on harms resulting from data uses, but
arms due to omission of data usage (or non-use of data) were also
onsidered. The review took a multi-faceted approach, using hard
nd soft evidence strands from legal sources, the grey literature
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: k.h.jones@swansea.ac.uk (K.H. Jones).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2016.09.010
386-5056/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access
c-nd/4.0/).BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
and social media, and merging the evidence for analysis [1]. How-
ever, little/no actual evidence of harm due to the non-use of data
was revealed by the searches used in the review, except that two
cases concerning interference in human rights were uncovered in
the legal strand. One focussed on a request for access to children’s
health data and the other on the non-disclosure of data on exposure
to radiation on Christmas Island in 1958 [1]. This lack of evidence
was no real surprise because the searches were focussed on ﬁnd-
ing proven cases of harm, and it would be challenging at best to
determine with a high degree of conﬁdence whether an instance
of harm was truly due to the non-use of data, or if its causes were
otherwise.
It is commonly acknowledged that health-related data routinely
collected as part of everyday practice, or generated as part of a
 article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
4 al of M
r
i
o
l
c
l
a
u
p
t
h
u
p
a
u
b
r
2
h
b
c
c
i
t
b
a
h
u
r
g
n
l
a
t
t
i
h
a
i
3
3
e
p
p
s
A
f
t
t
o
d
h
o
d
w
c
a
f4 K.H. Jones et al. / International Journ
esearch study, have great potential to improve patient care, cit-
zens’ lives and professional services. However, this potential is
ften thwarted by data non-use. There is much publicity about data
osses and misuses of data, but what about the other side of the
oin − harms due to the non-use of health-related data? There is a
ack of evidence about the reasons these data are not being used, an
ssociated lack of appreciation of the harms arising from their non-
se, and little indication of the scale of the problem. Therefore, this
aper focusses on the non-use of health-related data. It sets out
o identify and discuss some important types of data non-use to
elp clarify why harms due to this issue are not more evident. By
sing international case study examples it will illustrate the types of
roblem that can arise through the non-use of health-related data
nd the implications of this for citizens and society. It will touch
pon some of the current initiatives to address data non-use, and
y exploring the apparent reasons for non-use, will highlight the
emaining challenges for effective data use.
. Approach
A crucial part of the approach used in this article is to focus on
arm due to the non-use of health-related data, as distinct from the
eneﬁts due to proper data usage. This is because it would be inac-
urate to invert the latter and effectively equate the two. That is, it
ould be dangerously misleading to postulate that beneﬁts result-
ng from the use of data would not have been realised, and that
he opposite outcomes would have occurred, if those data had not
een used. Whilst the complexities and constraints of the legislative
nd regulatory governance frameworks are undoubtedly relevant
ere, some other, rather fundamental, factors are at play in the non-
se of data. Using a case study approach, issues with clinical care
ecords and research data will be considered before moving on to
overnance frameworks. This will illustrate sources and types of
on-use, their implications, possible reasons they occur and chal-
enges to be addressed. It is appreciated that clinicians, researchers
nd governance professionals will have an awareness of issues, par-
icularly within their own domains, but one of the novel aspects of
his study is to consider a more holistic view of data non-use and
ts impacts. This is the ﬁrst known study to address the topic of
ealth-related data non-use in this way. The article is written from
 UK standpoint, but this is a global issue, and therefore includes
nternational case studies.
. Results and discussion
.1. Clinical records
In 1995, the UK National Audit Ofﬁce (NAO) published a report
ntitled ‘Setting the Records Straight’[2] which noted numerous
roblems with the keeping of paper case-notes. Among the hos-
itals studied, 12 of the 16 kept multiple sets of case-notes for
ome patients, which could lead to confusion in administering care.
mong 121 clinics, only two-thirds of case-notes were at hand
or immediate use, and although most were located in adequate
ime, on some occasions (up to 3%) the search was fruitless and
he patient was unable to receive their consultation. This has seri-
us implications for the continuity of patient care, and may  force a
elay in surgical procedures or other interventions because patient
istory cannot be veriﬁed. It carries professional risks to the duty
f care of the clinical team in not being able to make informed
ecisions. It also imposes an unnecessary ﬁnancial burden due to
asted time for staff and patients. Missing case-notes can bias
linical audit, thus skewing the information used to monitor and
dvance clinical practice. For example, an audit of antenatal risk
actors found that 6.4% of the case-notes were missing. Althoughedical Informatics 97 (2017) 43–51
this sounds like a relatively small proportion, the suggestion was
that this was non-random due to clinicians holding onto interest-
ing cases for research or further discussion [3]. As well as entire
case-notes going missing, individual test and procedure results, and
sometimes episodes of care can be missing from the ﬁle. This again
may delay timely care leading to poorer outcomes and subject the
patient to duplicate risky invasive processes. It also wastes public
money and staff time [2].
Since the publications of this NAO report two decades ago, there
have been considerable advances in the use of electronic clinical
systems in healthcare. Nevertheless, the UK is still a long way  from
having a comprehensive electronic patient record, let alone being
able to use and share it effectively. Swansea University hosts the UK
Multiple Sclerosis (MS) Register [4]. When the Register was being
established in 2009, a survey of clinical recordkeeping methods in
NHS Neurology clinics across the UK was  carried out. Of the 47
respondent clinics (N = 83), 5 still used paper records only, 8 stated
that they used a word processor package, and only 10 reported
using an MS-speciﬁc clinical IT system [5]. Purposive action was
needed in order to facilitate data collection for the MS Register, and
an open-source clinical system was adapted and made available to
participating sites. There does not seem to be any reason to assume
that Neurology is vastly different to most other disciplines, and so
the signiﬁcance of this is that the pace of change towards electronic
systems is slow, and that without the use such systems, the effec-
tive use of data is hampered. Although there are moves towards
increasing the use of clinical systems, data sharing and research
opportunities in the UK NHS [6,7], these remain largely aspirational
for many care practitioners. The main focus for health practition-
ers is on delivering optimal patient care, and with the current high
demands, staff are inevitably limited in the effort they can dedi-
cate to other pursuits without strategic-level decisions to provide
sufﬁcient funding, training and time [8,9]. Until these issues can
be addressed effectively, problems due to the non-use of case-note
data will continue.
However, even when a clinical IT system is in place, there are
issues that impact on data availability for use. The traditional posi-
tion is of data in silos, such that primary care data are generally
available only within the practice and not systematically shared
with hospitals. Indeed, even within a given hospital, data are often
still held on administrative or departmental systems that may  or
may  not communicate with each other. A team of healthcare pro-
fessionals may  be involved in an episode of care, some of whom
may  enter data into the system, and some of whom may  record
data on paper to be transcribed later by an administrator. Although
it may  never be intended that every piece of information should
reside in the electronic system, this does introduce the possibil-
ities of error and non-entry of important data. It is also the case
that when an electronic system is implemented, a judgement call
has to be made on the bases of relevance and resources as to how
much back data are entered into the system. Furthermore clinical
systems may  have usability deﬁciencies and data entry constraints
that prove difﬁcult to work with resulting in major problems such
as were seen with the EPIC system at Cambridge University Hospi-
tals NHS Foundation Trust (England) [10,11]. Thus there are issues
of data quality and completeness within individual systems to con-
tend with before we consider interoperability problems which can
limit combining information from different systems. Without this,
the data are still in silos, albeit now electronic ones. A case in point
is that of a vulnerable little boy who died in 2011 following system-
atic abuse. There were multiple visits and reports to the GP practice,
health visitor, community paediatrics and emergency departments.
Each instance was  isolated as the data on presentations elsewhere
were not available. Because of this, instances were not seen in con-
text and the problems were not identiﬁed in time to save the life of
the child [12].
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Among the classic difﬁculties in data compatibility are differ-
ng formats and data structures which may  inhibit data integration,
nd different coding systems which limit semantic interoperability.
he power of data is only realisable if they can be made accessi-
le across clinical and scientiﬁc communities and national borders.
hallenges such as these are already the focus of multi-disciplinary,
ulti-national initiatives [13]. The problem is widespread and
ong-standing as often data systems are not created with sharing
n mind at the outset. For example, in the UK primary care ser-
ices use Read codes to record diagnoses [14], whereas hospital
ettings often use the International Classiﬁcation of Disease (ICD)
nd OPCS nomenclatures [15,16]. These differences require a means
f translation in order to interpret information from one system to
nother when seeking to provide the best patient care. There is a
ove to standardise coding systems to promote interoperability
y means of the Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine Clinical
erms (SNOMED CT). This system provides a comprehensive clini-
al terminology and it has been adopted in over 50 countries [17].
t takes considerable ﬁnancial resource, time and effort to imple-
ent a standard coding system, but it is essential that information is
onsistent and transferable if data are to be used optimally for indi-
idual patient care and, beyond that, to maximise their usefulness
n studies for wider beneﬁts.
A major problem that ensues from the non-use of clinical data
n all its guises is misdiagnosis. The incidence of delayed, missed
nd incorrect diagnoses has been estimated at between 10 and
0% [18] Although the majority of these errors are of little conse-
uence or instances are rectiﬁed in good time, it has been estimated
rom autopsies in the US that 40,000 to 80,000 deaths per year are
ccounted for by misdiagnosis, with many more suffering injury
19]. Many reasons may  contribute to this problem, but data non-
se is likely to be causal in at least some of these cases. As well as
easons already described, lack of proper interpretation of available
ata presents another form of non-use. It has been noted that most
edical training programs have no dedicated curriculum on diag-
osis, assuming instead that the skill will be passed from senior to
unior staff [20]. With the increasing volume and complexity of data
n medical records and charts, it is an even more pressing issue that
ptimal use of available data is enabled by ensuring that clinicians
re trained in the necessary interpretive skills. This is critical for
atient care and to rein in the rising costs of healthcare [20]. Some-
hat ironically, insufﬁcient use is being made of available clinical
ata at the bedside, at least partly due to lack of analysis skills, and
n the wider research arena, where the skills might be more readily
vailable, effective use of data is hampered by lack of availability.
.2. Research data
Though the impacts of research are not immediate, in that it
akes time for ﬁndings to be translated into policy and practice, the
on-use of data in research can have far reaching effects on patient
are, the healthcare profession and the economics of health ser-
ices. There are a variety of reasons why this occurs: some related
o the conduct of research and some to the failure to make the
ndings of research available.
.2.1. Conduct of research
The issue of data absence within clinical IT systems is an obvi-
us cause of data non-use through non-availability for research.
 study of 10,000 electronic health records in New York found
hat the selection process whereby researchers naturally aim for
ata completeness can result in systematic bias in analysis. This is
ecause sicker patients tend to have a higher degree of data sufﬁ-
iency within their records [21]. This is an enduring challenge for
tudies relying on the reuse use of data, since data items result-
ng from tests and procedures are simply not present for healthyedical Informatics 97 (2017) 43–51 45
individuals. Although selection bias is a well-known problem in
research, this particular case was chosen because it was shown to
have occurred in the clinical records, that is, before the data would
reach researchers who would therefore not know the extent of
bias before they begin. But unless it is taken into account, the ﬁnd-
ings may  not represent the population from which the sample was
drawn, since they will over-estimate the problem and limit exter-
nal validity [21]. This is the converse of the problem identiﬁed in the
antenatal clinical audit earlier (Section 3.1) [3], where some of the
problematic cases were excluded, thus underestimating the extent
of issues to be addressed. Either way, the ﬁndings could be mis-
leading and lead to suboptimal recommendations. However, unless
individual cases could be obtained, examined and followed up, it
would be difﬁcult to assess the extent to which harm due to the
non-use of data occurs. Even then, it would be challenging to show
cause and effect in this type of non-use.
Within the non-commercial sector, the majority of substantial
health and social care research takes place in academia. Researchers
often invest considerable time, energy and intellectual effort into
gathering, collating and analysing datasets, and there are still few
incentives for the onward sharing of data [22]. Researchers may  also
be under intense pressure to produce high impact outputs for the
UK’s Research Excellence Framework (REF) and similar initiatives
in other countries [23]. Some have argued that this is an unethical
practice, since it inﬂuences the research that is carried out and what
is ultimately published [24].
3.2.2. Availability of research ﬁndings
Sometimes although data are used, the research ﬁndings are not
made available or they are disseminated selectively. As a result,
the beneﬁts of the data are not realised and harm may  occur as
if the data had not been used. Publication bias is a well-known
phenomenon, with weaker or negative ﬁndings less likely to make
it in to the journals. Biomed Central has established the Journal of
Negative Results in Biomedicine to publish ‘unexpected, controversial,
provocative and/or negative results in the context of current tenets’
[25]. But an impact factor of 1.47 offers little kudos, and as long as
current expectations persist, it is likely that many researchers will
have to concentrate their efforts on hitting their targets. As a result,
publication bias will remain a source of data non-use, biasing the
direction of further work and allowing studies with undesirable
ﬁndings to be repeated unnecessarily. The resulting waste of time
and effort represents an opportunity cost as public money could
be better utilised and needless duplicative intrusion into patients’
lives be avoided.
The commercial sector invests billions in drug development and
clinical trials. Taking into account the high failure rate in drug cre-
ation, it is estimated that it costs approximately $5 billion to bring
a new drug to market [26]. As well as seeking the best treatments
for patients, pharmaceutical companies are, of course, concerned
with generating income and protecting their intellectual property.
As a result, the information they release about drugs may be biased
by being selected to maintain and extend their market share. In
his book ‘Bad Pharma: how medicine is broken and how we can
ﬁx it’, Ben Goldacre states that it is beyond doubt that ‘industry-
funded trials are more likely to produce positive, ﬂattering results than
independently-funded trials’ [27]. For example, a 2010 review of tri-
als suggested that 85% of industry-funded ﬁndings were positive,
compared to only 50% of government-funded trials. A variety of rea-
sons are proposed for this higher rate of apparent success including:
not publishing unﬂattering results; comparing a new drug against
a placebo, or against an inadequate drug at too low a dose; select-
ing patients without proper randomisation; or using small, speciﬁc
sample groups [27]. Though these practices are well-known, they
represent a form of data non-use with serious consequences as we
illustrate with examples here.
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There have been some devastating examples where non-use
f data due to non-publication of research ﬁndings has been
inked to harm to individuals. A particularly high-proﬁle exam-
le occurred in the UK in 2006, in a ﬁrst-in-man commercial trial
f an immune-modulatory drug referred to as TGN1412 [28]. Six
ealthy volunteers were administered with the drug and within an
our they began suffering serious side-effects. The Department of
ealth convened an Expert Advisory Group to investigate the sit-
ation and develop recommendations to try and prevent similar
ccurrences. In response to the question of whether the situa-
ion could have been avoided, it transpired that there had been
ome experience with a similar intervention ten years previously.
 researcher presented the inquiry with unpublished data relating
o the use of an antibody molecule with parallel effects in a sin-
le human subject. No one could have foreseen the signiﬁcance of
his unpublished piece of information, but the ﬁnal report recom-
ended that the results of every ﬁrst-in-man trial should be made
vailable to avoid a repeat of the ordeal to which the six volunteers
ere subjected. However, a review conducted in 2009 showed that
he majority of these Phase 1 trials were still not being published,
llowing this form of data non-use to continue [29]. At the time of
riting, an investigation is underway into a phase 1 commercial
rial conducted in France in 2015 which proved fatal for at least
ne of six participants, with the others hospitalised. After the 2006
K trial, recommendations were that participants in phase 1 tri-
ls should receive the test drug sequentially not simultaneously.
nvestigations continue, with more information needed, but this
ecommendation does not appear to have been followed properly
30].
Harm to patients through non-publication of data is exempliﬁed
n the use of an antiarrhythmic drug administered in the 1980s to
atients who had suffered a heart attack. In this case it is estimated
hat over 100,000 patients died of a heart attack after taking the
rug before it was realised that it was not appropriate for people
ho did not have arrhythmia. As to whether this disastrous situa-
ion was avoidable, it transpired that a small study had been carried
ut in 1980 in which 9 of 48 men  who took the antiarrhythmic
rug (Lorcainide) died, compared to 1 of 47 taking the placebo. The
rug was dropped for commercial reasons and the ﬁndings were
ot published. Over a decade later the researchers did publish and
tated that their results might have provided an early warning [31].
Sometimes there are direct accusations that data have been
ithheld to the detriment of patients. Dabigatran is a drug devel-
ped by Boehringer Ingelheim as one of the new generation oral
nti-coagulants for the prevention of stroke. It was  approved and
dopted in the UK, other parts of Europe, Japan, Canada and the
S (2008–2011) at least partly because it was marketed as a single
osage drug. That is, it did not require dose level adjustments based
n plasma levels or anticoagulant activity, thus making it simpler
o administer and avoiding the monitoring needed in older drugs
ike warfarin. By 2012 it had achieved blockbuster status (global
nnual turnover >$1 billion). However, the number of fatal bleeds
ccumulated, with the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) receiv-
ng reports of 542 deaths and 2367 reports of haemorrhage among
atients on Dabigatran; at the time, there was no antidote. Bleeds
re a known risk factor with anti-coagulants, but by comparison,
arfarin accounted for 72 deaths in the same period. It transpired
hat the company knew there were serious risks with single dose
evel administration, but that it withheld this information from reg-
lators for market advantage [32]. Boehringer Ingelheim has since
eceived approval to market a Dabigatran antidote and the drug
ontinues to be used [33].Lack of transparency and failure to use clinical trial data fully
ontinue to be major concerns [34]. February 2016 saw the call
or an investigation into the use of another new oral anticoagu-
ant, Rivoraxaban, developed by Bayer. It was evaluated againstedical Informatics 97 (2017) 43–51
warfarin in a clinical trial and it has become evident that data
about the device used to monitor the warfarin arm of the trial are
unreliable. In a response to requests to share data for independent
analysis, Bayer stated that this is not within the current scope of
their clinical trial data sharing [35]. Once a drug is on the market,
regulators such as the FDA and the European Medicines Agency
(EMA) do not have a mandate to take action unless there are safety
concerns. Again the risk is serious bleeds if the dose is too high or
stroke if the dose is too low. If independent reanalysis goes ahead
and ﬁndings point to changes in the safety proﬁle of Rivoraxaban,
regulators should be able to act and endorse tailored dosing [35].
These examples demonstrate the harms associated with data non-
use in commercial trials and the challenges of bringing these to
light so action can be taken. Extended delays and failures to dis-
seminate trial results effectively are not limited to the commercial
sector, but also occur in academia to the detriment of potential
recipients [36–38]. The All Trials campaign, set up in 2013, is a
widely-supported international initiative calling for all clinical tri-
als to be registered and their results reported so that standards can
be raised, greater beneﬁts achieved and harms avoided in future
[39]. But questions remain about adequate repercussions for wil-
ful non-use of trial data as even large ﬁnes may  not approach the
annual revenue that companies gain from drug sales [32], and in
the meantime the problem continues and patients are harmed.
3.3. Governance frameworks
This brings us to consider the impact of governance frame-
works on the non-use of data. ‘Governance frameworks’ in this
context refers to the body of legislation and regulations relevant
to the sharing and use of data within a jurisdiction. They are in
place to ensure responsible and appropriate data use, to protect
individual privacy and safeguard professionals. However, some of
these, such as the Research Governance Frameworks in the UK
have long been blamed for hampering the use of data and hin-
dering research [40,41]. Consequently much work is underway to
improve the situation through increased data sharing, open data
initiatives and streamlining approval processes [7,42–46]. Criti-
cisms have also been levelled at subjective interpretations resulting
in over-cautious implementation and unnecessary bureaucracy.
These may  include lengthy forms and approval processes, compli-
cated steps and numerous parties involved in approval procedures,
over-stringent rules on data access, and the lack of clear responsi-
bilities delaying permissions [40,41]. Despite on-going initiatives
[7,42–46], there remain huge challenges to be addressed in the use
of data, not only for research, but also for service and care plan-
ning. It is a commonly-held belief among the public that healthcare
and government administrative data are already linked and shared
across services [47]. However, this is of course not the case at least
in the UK, since data are not even routinely shared and linked across
different sectors of the health service for clinical and management
purposes. While it is important to protect individual privacy and
rights in data access [48], it does mean there is great potential for
harm through lack of joined-up information. For example, obser-
vationally, UK hospital patients are asked if they are taking any
medication before they are treated in hospital. A similar process
occurs with other practitioners such as community pharmacists
and dentists before they prescribe. A more reliable approach would
be to review their primary care record if it were accessible. Med-
ication errors are the single most common preventable cause of
adverse events in medical practice [49], and it is easy to argue
that more joined-up information could circumvent at least some
of these occurrences.
However, both individuals and their practitioners may  not
ﬁnd combining and sharing identiﬁable data with other practi-
tioners acceptable without their respective agreements [50]. The
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overnance frameworks that exist rightly serve to safeguard indi-
idual privacy, human rights, privacy and the duties of care and
onﬁdence, but even so, legal authority is not the same as social
icence [51]. Our understanding of public expectations of therapeu-
ic relationships remains limited, and this is another factor that may
xacerbate the data non-use conundrum [52]. But what is known
s that most people are willing for their records to be used for
edical research providing that data are anonymised [53]. While
his is a valuable insight, more work needs to be done to increase
rustworthy data sharing.
In order to make use of personal data for research, it is routinely
ecessary to obtain regulatory approvals, often including partici-
ants’ informed consent; this is an established and proper part of
esearch ethics and governance frameworks to safeguard individ-
al human rights [54]. However, it can be argued that, in some
ases the pursuit of informed consent can disadvantage certain
roups, particularly those who are hard to reach or on the edges
f society [55]. This is almost certainly the case when addressing
wicked’ problems associated with abuses in childhood, which may
nly become apparent in young adults. These include psychoso-
ial issues, school failures and drop-outs, risk-taking behaviours,
ubstance misuse and juvenile crime. A strong argument can be
ade that, as such problems require the best data, insisting on
onsent for observational studies using existing data is a failure
f duty [56]. A similar argument in relation to bias due to consent
as evidenced by comparing baseline and follow-up data from GP
nd hospital records on patients who did, with those who did not,
onsent to an intracranial malformation study. The results showed
hat consenters were different in ways that could not have been
stimated in advance. The authors concluded that those who  over-
ee medical research are harming public health by imposing greater
onstraints on patient data than those required by the law [57].
owever, in considering the requirement for consent, it is impor-
ant to distinguish between non-interventional studies that rely on
bservational data only, compared to invasive studies such as phase
 trials where new medications or procedures are being tested. But
ven in apparently low-risk studies there are risks to be mitigated,
uch as re-identiﬁcation of individuals with the possible repercus-
ions that may  bring. Achieving the optimum balance where rights
nd beneﬁts are in accord is challenging and unlikely to be constant
ver time, with dependencies on factors such as the state of the art
n research, infrastructure and societal perceptions.
Within the UK the speciﬁc regulatory mechanism that permits
he use of identiﬁable data without consent, by over-riding the
ommon law duty of conﬁdentiality for important medical and
esearch purposes, comes under section 251 of the NHS Act 2006
58]. Applications are administered by the Conﬁdentiality Advi-
ory Group of the Health Research Authority [59], but anecdotally,
he success rate is low and applicants are strongly encouraged to
ursue the consent route or to use anonymous data where at all
ossible. In some cases, this does not compromise the purpose, but
n others it does. Nevertheless there are many success stories; for
xample, the lead author is engaged in a study of vulnerable young
others and their children that has successfully obtained s251 sup-
ort. Without this, the study would have been biased because the
articipants could not be followed-up reliably. Even so, the waiver
as granted for matching purposes only: that is, so that the study
ata could be linked to hospital and education data, and it was
 condition of the approval that the resulting de-identiﬁed data
ould be accessed via a Safe Haven [60,61].
The UK Information Governance Review published in 2013,
ommonly referred to as Caldicott 2, proposes that the duty to
hare information can be as important as the duty to protect patient
onﬁdentiality [6]. This principle is embodied in the UK Care Act
f 2014 with a new legal requirement for research regulators to
ork together both to protect research participants and promoteedical Informatics 97 (2017) 43–51 47
research [62]. Caldicott 2 also includes considerable discussion on
Safe Havens as ‘specialist, well governed, independently scrutinised
accredited environments’  as the sole location where the linkage of
personal conﬁdential data from more than one organisation for any
purpose other than direct care should take place. This helps to high-
light the innovative work that has been underway for some years on
the development of Safe Havens for access to de-identiﬁed linked
data for research. The Secure Anonymised Information Linkage)
SAIL and (Scottish Health Informatics Programme) SHIP systems are
examples where approved researchers can access data for research
within a secure environment [63–65]. However, although Safe
Havens hold great promise for using a wealth of valuable, extensive
health-related datasets, they are still subject to limitations [66]. Not
least among these is the constraint of using anonymised data only.
Many types of study do not require identiﬁable data to produce
beneﬁts, as proven by the rich array of important research outputs
produced via anonymous data linkage research; a good example
being work conducted via the long-established Western Australia
data linkage unit [67]. However, sometimes anonymised data are
simply not sufﬁcient, particularly in studies aiming to beneﬁt indi-
viduals directly and to be used to support clinical decisions.
Moreover, anonymised data still require control measures
because of re-identiﬁcation risks: it has been established that indi-
viduals can sometimes be re-identiﬁed from data purported to have
been anonymised [68]. Because of this, it is good governance prac-
tice that such data are curtailed before being made available for
research. This may  take the form of aggregation or suppression of
records, or in some cases perturbative methods may be employed
[69]. But this can create another form of data non-use and pro-
duce bias in research ﬁndings, because individual records or items
within those records, where they occur in unique or low-copy num-
bers, may  be amended or omitted to mitigate perceived risks of
re-identiﬁcation. Often, the more unusual records and extreme data
items are the most interesting for research, since they may  under-
lie pressing health problems. So this well-intentioned practice can
limit external validity as the application of results will gravitate to
treating the mean characteristics and phenotypes in the popula-
tion. Furthermore, conditions for the use of anonymised data often
include no reversal of the process to lead back to individuals. This,
therefore, precludes the opportunity to highlight a worrying indi-
cator in their data, since to do this would require permission to hold
identiﬁable information, to the frustration of medical researchers
and clinicians and the detriment of patients. So although the use
of anonymised data is proving to be invaluable in data linkage
research, they are still subject to forms of data non-use.
As with the vulnerable little boy who  died following abuse (Sec-
tion 3.1), it can be argued that too much emphasis is placed on
the risks of implementing data sharing initiatives, rather than on
the potentially enormous risks of not making data available [12]. A
powerful example of this is that in 2013 in the US, the Centres for
Medicare and Medicaid Services began withholding claims with a
substance-use disorder from research datasets because of privacy
concerns. It is estimated that this disorder is associated with over
60,000 deaths in the US each year, that it costs society hundreds
of billions of dollars, as well as untold emotional damage to fami-
lies. Yet, harm due to breaches of these data is unknown and there
is no evidence that the data cannot be properly secured for use in
research. Without these data it is felt that research is ‘ﬂying blind’
[70]. The perspective that regulatory regimes can result in greater
harm than the risks they seek to address is widely known, and
this led Australian researchers to coin the term ‘privacy protection-
ism’ [71]. Furthermore, a recent report from the Canadian Council
of the Academies states that ‘the risk of potential harm resulting
from access to data is tangible but low. The level of risk can be fur-
ther lowered through effective governance mechanisms.’ And ‘timely
access to data is hindered by variable legal structures and differing
4 al of M
i
d
w
a
a
t
o
t
A
c
S
s
u
a
i
i
T
e
r
t
h
o
o
a
t
t
a
i
g
f
a
t
e
a
i
d
c
w
s
p
O
a
t
l
d
r
w
D
e
p
t
w
o
t
a
w
f
b
t
d
u
i
s
in the name of caution. This includes appropriate interpretation
and implementation requiring staff training and the expertise of
responsible ofﬁcers.8 K.H. Jones et al. / International Journ
nterpretations of the terms identiﬁable and de-identiﬁed across juris-
ictions’ [72].
Non-use of health-related data in relation to governance frame-
orks takes a variety of forms, and can result in wasted time
nd lost opportunities. The case studies suggest misunderstandings
mong those administering frameworks may  be at play, and that
here may  be issues inherent within some frameworks. The extent
f public support for health-related data usage is an important fac-
or, but one about which knowledge is incomplete and fragmented.
s a result, greater constraints may  be imposed out of a con-
ern for privacy without necessarily providing better safeguards.
ometimes approval processes can be laborious and complex pos-
ibly due to over-caution and a fear of making mistakes in the
se of personal data. Even when using anonymised data, concerns
bout re-identiﬁcation may  result in over-stringent controls being
mposed, such that data utility is compromised without necessar-
ly demonstrating improved data security and privacy protection.
hese issues raise difﬁcult questions about the balance between
nsuring privacy and seeking better patient care.
Furthermore, governance frameworks are not static, and new
egulations and their interpretations can have positive and nega-
ive consequences for data use. A review of consent for data use
as been published (UK) which proposes a new model for the use
f personal conﬁdential data beyond direct care [73]. (This is part
f a wider report referred to as Caldicott 3.) Such data are seen
s essential for the running of the UK’s health and social care sys-
em, to support the provision of high quality care, for improving
he safety of care and for protecting public health through research
nd innovation. The report recommends that (alongside the exist-
ng models for consent to research studies) individuals should be
iven the opportunity to opt out of their identiﬁable data being used
or these purposes, and that this preference would be respected
cross health and social care settings. Individuals would also have
he opportunity to change their mind. This mechanism aims to
nable greater data sharing and onward data use, but there are
lready questions around the practicalities of recording and enact-
ng preferences and the unknown impact of bias due to incomplete
atasets. Also, as proposed, it would still not allow individuals to
hoose which aspects of their data they are willing to share and
hich not. This may  result in individuals who wish to keep only
ome details of their records private opting out of data sharing com-
letely. It is early days and the proposal is to be put to consultation.
bviously, robust, proportionate governance is imperative to bal-
nce data protection and utility, but when it comes to solutions
here are no magic bullets [74].
At the same time as great efforts are being made to stream-
ine and simplify governance procedures and to encourage greater
ata accessibility, other moves may  pose a serious threat to cur-
ent research practice. During its development, concerns were
idely expressed that the European Commission’s new General
ata Protection Regulation (GDPR) would prohibit much medical,
pidemiological and social science research due to amendments
roposed by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liber-
ies, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE committee) [75,76]. The GDPR
as the subject of high proﬁle campaigns and sterling work co-
rdinated by the European Data in Health Alliance [77]. The agreed
ext was passed at the end of 2015, and it was welcomed because
 reasonable compromise has been reached on many of the more
orrying issues for research [78]. However some concerns remain,
or example, Recital 23 suggests that pseudonymised data should
e considered personal data, with pseudonymisation deﬁned in the
ext (A.4(3b)) as ‘the processing of personal data in such a way that the
ata can no longer be attributed to a speciﬁc data subject without the
se of additional information, as long as such additional information
s kept separately and subject to technical and organisational mea-
ures to ensure non-attribution to an identiﬁed or identiﬁable person’edical Informatics 97 (2017) 43–51
[79]. Depending upon how this is interpreted, it could have practi-
cal implications in relation to participant consent for certain types
of studies and for data usages that are currently exempt. The GDPR
will bring increased ﬁnancial and other penalties for data breaches
(A79(3) [79], and while this move is welcomed from a safety per-
spective, it places greater pressure on organisations to avoid the
penalties. This could feasibly result in an unwanted by-product in
the form of greater privacy-protectionism, which could increase
data non-use. The GDPR comes into force in 2018 and the work
is not over yet1: intelligent interpretation and implementation of
the Regulation will be essential to ensure that it does not introduce
new regulatory burdens for research and undermine sophisticated
data linkage and sharing infrastructures, such as Safe Havens. Oth-
erwise its administration could herald a new era of data non-use to
the detriment of health and wellbeing.
In combination, the non-use of health-related data has far-
reaching but often unquantiﬁable consequences. It is a deadly
serious issue sometimes eclipsed by outrage over privacy violations
and security breaches, which may only be due to a vociferous and
possibly badly-informed minority. A strong statement on this line
comes from a US report which states that the non-use of patient
clinical data is a greater risk than misuse, such that: ‘[T]he great-
est threat, the biggest risk to people with diabetes, or heart disease, or
cancer, or HIV/AIDs or any other chronic disease or disability seems
not to be from un-authorized sharing or use of their personal health
information, rather it is from the failure to share or the inadequate use
of that information, and sometimes even valuing protecting privacy
over protecting an individual’s life, their health, and the health of their
families, friends and neighbors’[80].
4. Recommendations and future research
4.1. Recommendations
A number of recommendations arise from the ﬁndings of this
study.
• Plans providing additional funding to implement clinical IT sys-
tems in healthcare must also include a commitment to support
culture changes in clinician practice and recognise the scope for
human error. This includes the need for improved training oppor-
tunities in data interpretation and analysis for clinicians to enable
more effective use of the data already available.
• Clinical IT systems must be ﬁt for setting but also be interoperable
to enable communication and data sharing, and this requires time
and effort as well as money.
• Initiatives promoting the onward sharing of clinical and research
data need to provide incentives for reuse, taking into account the
personal and organisational investments in creating datasets and
the intellectual property they may  represent.
• Within the research domain, there are penalties for data misuse
and abuse, but there appear to be few repercussions for wilful or
negligent data non-use. This raises questions about appropriate
measures, as in the case of commercial companies annual revenue
from drug sales can far outweigh current ﬁnes imposed [32].
• Governance frameworks and their administration need to be pro-
portionate, so that they protect but do not impose excess burdens1 Questions remain regarding the adoption of GDPR in the UK  following the Brexit
vote in the EU referendum (23/6/16). However, it is unlikely that there would be
signiﬁcant divergence from the standards of data protection in Europe, and highly
likely that there would be equivalence in legislation.
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Summary points
What was already known
• Breaches and misuses of health-related data can have seri-
ous implications and consequently they can be high-profile
• Harm due to the omission of health-related data usage, or
data non-use, has lacked attention
• Previous work has dealt with some instances of data non-use
in specific settings or sectors
• This is the first known study to address the wider perspective
of health-related data non-use
What this study adds
• Harm due to health-related data non-use can be difficult to
ascertain and attribute unequivocally
• There is ample indirect evidence that it is implicated in the
deaths of many thousands of people and potentially £billions
in financial burdens to societies
• Health-related data non-use can occur as a trail across set-
tings and sectors, compounding its effects
• Better understanding of the types of, and reasons for, health-
related data non-use is needed to inform initiatives toK.H. Jones et al. / International Journ
Governance regimes need to be tailored and proportionate so that
they are robust and at the same time do not limit opportunities
and data utility for research and patient care. For example, emerg-
ing forms of data for reuse such as free-text, image and omic
data may  present different privacy challenges, and be subject to
different public perceptions, than structured micro-data.
The tension between data privacy and better patient care needs to
be rebalanced through greater support for trustworthy initiatives
for data reuse. Since it is known that anonymised data reuse has
majority support, further work with the public should focus on
how data should be shared, with whom and for which purposes
with mechanisms to allow individual choice, not simply one-size
ﬁts all.
Although large-scale anonymised data are proving invaluable in
research, more should be done towards facilitating the use of
identiﬁable data where it would add particular value.
More awareness of the many factors that contribute to the trail of
health data non-use would be highly beneﬁcial for all concerned
with data use, so that healthcare practitioners, clinical coders,
clinical system developers, multi-disciplinary researchers, gov-
ernance professionals and the public understand more about the
potential impacts of data non-use en route to decision-making for
individual care and wider society.
It is imperative that the many factors that contribute to the non-
se of health-related data are addressed to move towards socially
esponsible reuse of data becoming the path of least resistance to
ave lives and resources.
.2. Future research
It has not been possible to cover all aspect of health data non-
se in this article, but the way has been opened for further in-depth
tudies, such as:
The impacts of data non-use on: the individual patient (such as
diagnosis, treatment, prescribed medications and health mainte-
nance); the clinical organisation (including hospital performance
in various key areas such as infectious disease control, surgical
error or readmission rates); a disease-speciﬁc or general popu-
lation across a large region or nation (including the impact on
clinical research by regulatory frameworks and their administra-
tion imposing inappropriate restrictions on data sharing).
A comparison of governance frameworks in the UK versus a selec-
tion of other countries, identifying the most and least productive
aspects of such frameworks with speciﬁc recommendations for
improving existing frameworks or constructing new ones.
An exploration of what the goal should be in reducing data non-
use regardless of its present political or technical feasibility, and
to determine if zero non-use is always the right goal or if there is
some level or type of non-use that is actually beneﬁcial.
Working with the public to raise awareness of the various types,
causes and impacts of data non-use to gain their perspectives on
how to move forward in a socially acceptable way.
Estimating the contribution of health informatics and informa-
tion technology to reducing health data non-use. This could
include systems that have been developed to address this
problem at the patient, organisation, and governmental levels,
including the trade-off between costs and beneﬁts, strengths and
weaknesses, applications and unintended consequences.. Conclusions
This article has used a case study approach to focus on the
on-use of health-related data. As such, it has not attempted anaddress this problem
exhaustive review nor does it purport to account for all types
of health data non-use. By highlighting issues with clinical care
records, research data and governance frameworks it has shown
why instances of health-related data non-use are not more evident,
and by using international case studies it has illustrated the types of
data non-use that occur, with their consequences for citizens and
society. It is the ﬁrst known study to have addressed health data
non-use in a wider perspective.
Instances of health-related data non-use can be associated with
harm, but when taken together the effects may  be magniﬁed via a
trail of data non-use barriers and bottlenecks, thus posing greater
threats by impacting multiple settings. An example of this would be
clinical care records to be used for research being subject to factors
such as missing elements, transcription errors and clinical system
constraints, followed by selection bias, failures in onward sharing,
lengthy governance processes with their perceived barriers, lack
of data transparency and publication bias before the ﬁndings are
taken forward to inform policy and patient care.
The most effective initiatives to address speciﬁc contexts of
data non-use will be those that: ﬁrstly, understand the pertinent
sources, types and reasons for data non-use in a given domain, in
order to meet the challenges and create appropriate incentives and
repercussions; and secondly, are cognisant of the multiple aspects
to this complex issue in other domains to keep beneﬁts and limita-
tions in perspective to move steadily towards socially responsible
reuse of data becoming the norm.
Looking for veriﬁed evidence of harm due to the non-use of
health-related data is like the blind man  in a dark room looking
for a large, agile, polymorphic, lethal, black cat that most certainly
is there. A better understanding of its nature is required before it
can be captured and successfully tamed.
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